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‘More than a Television Channel’: Channel 4, FilmFour and a failed 
convergence strategy 
 
This paper examines the rise of convergent television in the UK, through a case 
study of the decisions taken by the commercial/ public service hybrid institution, 
Channel 4, throughout the 2000s, with particular focus on the filmmaking arm, 
FilmFour.  Channel 4 was set up in 1982 to widen the scope of public service 
broadcasting in the UK, target underserved minorities, take editorial and creative 
risks, and commission programmes from an emergent independent television sector.  
By the late 1990s competition from specialist pay-TV services was increasing, and 
Channel 4 needed a strategy to secure its finances and fulfil its challenging remit.   
Spearheaded by a dynamic Chief Executive in Michael Jackson, the Channel 4 
Television Corporation (C4) expanded into various media-related businesses.  It 
wanted to become, as the 2000 Annual Report boldly stated, ‘More than a Television 
Channel’.  In other words, the channel intended to become an all-purpose, 
convergence-friendly multimedia operation. C4 apparatchiks posited the spending 
during this period as a necessary investment to secure the broadcaster’s future in a 
digital marketplace, but most of it provided neither the financial sustenance to keep 
C4 buoyant nor the prestigious or socially useful content a public service broadcaster 
should bring into being.   
 
 
Figure 1 Front cover of C4 2000 Annual report.  Its tagline reads ‘More than a Television Channel’. 
 
4VENTURES 
Channel 4 only began in earnest to strategize for a digital future in the late 1990s.   
The idea was to ‘transform from a single television channel into a network of media 
business on a range of platforms’ or, to put it another way, to become a broadcaster 
more able to cope with a future where TV converges with new media.   In 2001 this 
  
network of businesses was gathered together under the holding company 4Ventures, 
a wholly-owned subsidiary.   
 
4Ventures launched in a climate of concern over C4’s commercial activities, which 
included Channel 4 Interactive and pay-TV channels FilmFour, a specialist arthouse 
-style film channel, and E4, a youth entertainment channel chiefly a repository for 
American imports for which C4 had paid a premium to compete with Sky.i  David 
Elstein, competitor Channel 5’s Chief Executive, led a chorus of voices arguing that 
these activities were without C4’s legal terms of trade, which stated that its core 
function was ‘the continued provision of the television broadcasting service known as 
Channel 4.’   Elstein pointed to an apparent £250 million ‘hole’ in the C4 finances – 
the difference between 2000’s revenue of £642 million and the programming budget 
of £390 million.  Profits seemingly weren’t being put back into programmes, defying 
the raison d’etre of C4.  The threat of privatisation also loomed, as it was a manifesto 
pledge of the Conservative party ahead of the general election.  
 
On advice from its lawyers, rather than a governmental or regulatory mandate, 
Channel 4 changed its organisational structure to separate the commercial 
properties from the main channel. The restructured Channel 4 Corporation looked 
like this: 
 
Figure 2 Corporate structure of C4 Television after creation of 4Ventures, 2001. 
 
Rob Woodward, nicknamed ‘Bob the Banker’, was headhunted from the City to be 
chief executive, bringing with him an obviously commercial agenda.  The changes 
created two broad silos; broadcast television was hived off from the sexier new 
media and digital offerings.  This implied that public service ideas were incompatible 
with digital expansion. Maggie Brown reported that this resulted in unease: 
  
The separation of new activities into 4Ventures would become divisive over 
the next few years, when the team that ran 4Ventures implied they were the 
future and Channel 4 itself was the past.  It became much harder to manage 
the two entities with their separate ambitions and cultures.ii 
Rather than the ‘natural evolution’ promised by Jackson, C4’s emerging 
convergence strategy was often defensive and reactive, its hand forced by political 
pressure and the interventions of its competitors.  The strategy was underpinned by 
profligate spending: £138.2 million was spent on new ventures between 1998 and 
2001.  The commercial enterprises were not built only on new media convergence.  
The most expensive and highly publicised business housed under 4Ventures was 
the channel’s film arm, FilmFour. 
 
Converging old media: FilmFour Ltd. 
Jackson claimed that C4’s expansion strategy was to take existing successes 
and build on them.  Nowhere was this clearer than in the creation of Film Four Ltd., a 
semi-vertically integrated movie producer and distributor that built on the Channel’s 
history of feature film production.   Channel 4 had always commissioned feature-
length film dramas for its Film on Four slot.  In the 1980s, some of these had 
achieved cinema distributions and during the 1990s, Channel 4 began to 
commission fewer, better-funded films, most of which were achieving cinema 
releases.  Some, like Four Weddings and a Funeral (Mike Newell, 1994) and 
Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996) were outstanding international successes.  In 
1998, FilmFour Ltd was established as a subsidiary of C4.  It had a great deal of 
autonomy, a Chief Executive, Paul Webster, recruited from the Disney-owned US 
indie Miramax, and separate headquarters, on fashionable Charlotte Street.  
Webster reported directly to Jackson, whose support of FilmFour, including the 
allocation of a £30 million production budget, was probably motivated by his own 
cinephilia as well as C4’s history of film support. 
 
This was a time of renewed confidence in the UK film industry.  As part of its focus 
on the ‘creative industries’ the New Labour government pledged enhanced public 
support for cinema, but priorities shifted from localised, low-budget production  to 
backing films expected to compete commercially in the international marketplace.  
The launch of the Film Council in 2000 made a clear statement of intent for the 
industry: its head John Woodward said ‘we are interested in films that can really play 
in cinemas on a Friday night, and we will not be backing films whose natural home is 
television’.iii  FilmFour’s ambitions to be an independent film studio within this culture 
meant that it too no longer wanted to back television-minded projects, but to pursue 
the higher risks and greater potential rewards of global distribution.  Budgets for 
projects rose and international partnerships, such as those with German distributor 
Senator or US major Warner Brothers were achieved.  
 
Charlotte Gray 
Pursuing the commercial market meant creative compromises which 
weakened the films, which were often glossy but depthless.  The best example is the 
film most frequently cited as the cause of FilmFour’s eventual demise, Charlotte 
Gray (Gillian Armstrong, 2001).  With a budget upwards of £15 million, it was the 
most expensive independent film ever made in Britain.  Its North American 
distributors, Warner Brothers unwisely opted for a December opening, hoping that 
this would produce the awards nominations that were increasingly central to 
  
marketing prestige dramas.  Awards committees were not convinced, even by the 
acting of the usually admired Cate Blanchett in the lead role.  As the preponderance 
of close ups of Blanchett in the trailer for the film demonstrates, it was sold to 
audiences on her star persona of outstanding acting talent and beauty. 
 
[Insert Trailer for Charlotte Gray Here. URL: http://youtu.be/dGrZhlkfA2w ] 
Figure 3 Cate Blanchett’s face is emphasised as the primary selling point of Charlotte Gray 
(FilmFour/Warner Brothers, 2002) 
 
 
The creative decision that probably killed the film’s chances was the use of 
‘Franglais’ – to have characters speak in accented English rather than in French.  In 
a story about the ability of the protagonist to assimilate seamlessly into a foreign 
society, this seemed silly.  For British reviewers of the film, the temptation to 
compare it to the 1980s sitcom Allo Allo (which was also set in occupied France with 
actors speaking ‘Franglais’) was too strong.  International sales meant that it broke 
even despite a lukewarm domestic box office performance, but the film did not 
provide the financial windfall for which it was designed.  Targeted too squarely at the 
international market, it was not distinctive or edgy like Channel 4 films had previously 
been. 
 
[Insert clip from Allo Allo here. URL: http://youtu.be/53V1KTQQYW8 ] 
Figure 4 UK critics found it difficult to avoid comparisons between Charlotte Gray and 'Allo 'Allo (BBC 
One, 1982 - 1992) 
 
Divergence 
Rather than being a convergent company with a shared vision and outlook, 
Channel 4’s subsidiary aimed to disassociate itself the public service aims of its 
parent company. Where filmmaking at Channel 4 had previously been an organic 
part of the offer of the main channel, conceived of as a fundamental part of its public 
service broadcasting remit, when FilmFour Ltd moved – literally and symbolically – 
away from Horseferry Road, it actually diverged from television.  Where at first 
glance FilmFour seems to demonstrate the convergence of cinema and broadcasting 
industries, film and television were rhetorically, geographically and philosophically 
distinct.iv 
 
The End of FilmFour Ltd. 
FilmFour was a high-profile casualty of the cost-cutting measures brought in 
by Mark Thompson when he replaced Michael Jackson as Chief Executive in 2002.  
These were inspired by uncertainty about the channel’s finances after a sharp 
downturn in advertising revenue in 2001 – 2002.  FilmFour’s distribution and sales 
team was shut down, fifty jobs lost, and the annual film budget slashed by two thirds, 
to £10 million.  Projects in development were lost, including Shaun of the Dead 
(Edgar Wright, 2004) which was later a hit for Working Title.  Rob Woodward blamed 
the failure of the company on the pressure of competition:  
Over the last four years, significant investment and hard work has gone into 
FilmFour Ltd. to develop it as a meaningful player internationally. However, 
this has not been possible given the sheer scale of the major studios.v 
  
There is some truth to this: the size of FilmFour in comparison to its international 
rivals meant that it would always be hard to compete, but this makes the optimism 
with which the company was started seem hubristic and naïve.   
 
Re-integration 
4Ventures was another victim of Thompson’s spending cuts.  In October 2002, 122 
jobs were axed in a major company restructure.  It became slimmer and more 
focused, and it halved its losses in 2003.   Woodward left 4Ventures in January 
2005, ahead of a restructure which stripped it of the digital channels, which were 
reintegrated into Channel 4 Television.  It was reduced from an expansive enterprise 
aimed at ‘future proofing’ the broadcaster to little more than an international sales 
operation making the most of Channel 4’s few assets and new media investments.  
Channel 4’s own press release highlighted the potential for cross-promotion when its 
television portfolio was brought together 
We also believe that E4, FilmFour and More 4 when it launches, stand the 
best chance of sustained growth by being placed at the creative heart of 
Channel 4, with a cross-channel, portfolio approach to commissioning, 
scheduling and marketing. 
The end of 4Ventures initiated a more convergent approach, where Channel 4’s core 
services were being spread across multiple digital platforms. Rather than its digital 
channels and online ventures being commercial investments, arguments were now 
made that the public service remit of the corporation was extended across its various 
digital outlets. 
 
In 2006 the film arm was re-integrated with the Channel’s drama department, and 
rebranded as Film4.    Film4 became a sleeker, more interesting operation, and there 
have been a number of notable successes since: box-office hits Slumdog Millionaire 
(2008) and The Inbetweeners Movie (2011), Oscar-winning dramas The Iron Lady 
(2011) and 12 Years a Slave (2013), handsome adaptations like Never Let Me Go 
(2010) and Wuthering Heights (2011), and acclaimed realist dramas like NEDS 
(2010), Tyrannosaur (2011) and The Selfish Giant (2013).   This is largely because 
of the leadership of its outgoing head, Tessa Ross, who is hugely respected in the 
industry for her strong ability to nurture talent.  Her departure for the National 
Theatre in 2014 potentially marks the end of a fertile creative period at Film4.   
Refocusing the film arm on quality content and talent meant that it was better 
able to cope with competition.  The 2006 Annual Report gives a strong indication of 
the new more genuinely convergent strategy of bringing film and television drama 
together: ‘As digital technology blurs the distinction between film and television, 
Film4 films continue to focus on talent – and keep on winning Oscars.’  This new 
convergence is perhaps best demonstrated in the This is England series.  It started 
as a feature film set in 1983, which told the story of a young skinhead group led 
astray by a racist thug, followed by two television sequels that revisited the gang in 
1986 and 1988.vi  As the table below indicates, the film and its sequels were relative 
successes for Channel 4, and each edition was also highly acclaimed by critics. 
 
This is England (2007) GB ticket sales: 305, 265  
This is England ’86 E1 7 September 2010 3, 434, 000 C4 viewers 
This is England ’86 E2 14 September 2010 2, 683, 000 viewers 
This is England ’86 E3 21 September 2010 2, 851, 000 viewers 
This is England ’86 E4 28 September 2010 2. 781, 000 viewers 
  
This is England ‘88’ E1 13 December 2011 3, 000, 000 viewers 
This is England ’88 E2 14 December 2011 2, 200, 000 viewers 
This is England ’88 E3 15 December 2011 1, 740, 000 viewers 
 
Because the sequels were produced as miniseries rather than films, the characters 
and story were more developed, and the emotional impact even greater.vii   This is 
an example of an intellectual property – the characters and stories of This is England 
- being exploited across film and television platforms: the kind of convergence fit for 
the contemporary context.  Moreover, Channel 4 was able to utilise its digital 
channels to cross-publicise This is England ’86 by scheduling a Shane Meadows 
‘season’ on the Film4 digital channel.  Once Upon a Time in the Midlands (2001), 
broadcast on 8 September, achieved 462, 000 viewers, more than four times that of 
its cinema audience.  Interviews with cast and crew produced for the season were 
made available on the Channel 4 website, an example of convergent repurposed 
content. 
 
Learning from FilmFour Ltd: the problem with convergence 
The story of FilmFour is instructive in understanding why 4Ventures failed in 
its pursuit of digital investments that would make a genuine and lasting contribution 
to Channel 4.  There seemed to be two fatal flaws in the strategy.  Firstly, it was 
overly dependent upon savvy management who would be able to spot a potential 
winner (be it feature film project or digital business) amongst a myriad of creative 
ideas.  The structure put in place in the early 2000s meant a lot of influence was 
concentrated in a small number of hands, while at the same time C4 became bloated 
and inefficient, where before it had been small and dynamic.  
 This leads to the second problem: C4, like FilmFour, was too small to 
compete effectively with conglomerates that were strategically in a better position to 
exploit the growing convergence between cinema, television and 
telecommunications.  FilmFour competed with Hollywood studios that had the 
finances, rights ownership, and distribution clout to dominate international film 
culture.  An independent film company with only £30m per year to play with can 
barely make an impression in such a climate.  The 4Ventures strategy was similarly 
unrealistic.  It invested strongly in digital multichannel, but in comparison to 
behemoths like BSkyB, which not only ran television channels but the platforms that 
carried them, only significant good fortune in some of their investments was likely to 
provide the hoped-for commercial gains.  When such luck was not forthcoming, the 
only option was to retrench. 
 
Tracing the convergence story through Annual Reports 
 
Looking at the annual reports C4 is obliged by law to produce each year offers a 
useful tool to follow this convergence story.  Careful reading of these archival 
documents can be revealing for researchers, especially if attention is paid to tone as 
well as data.  For example, the 2001 Annual Report that introduces 4Ventures 
demonstrates an attempt at mitigation, constantly reminding readers that the 
company began life in a severe economic downturn.  Unlike the bullish confidence of 
the report from the year before, this document betrays a moroseness which predicts 
the large cuts to follow, almost suggesting that the convergence strategy was 
destined to fail in its early days.viii   
  
Emphases and absences in annual reports are particularly telling.  FilmFour 
Ltd. is conspicuously absent from the 2002 report, the year in which it had been 
drastically cut back.   However, where this document spends several pages 
explaining the meaning of multi-channel television to justify C4’s convergence 
strategy, in 2003 and particularly 2004, the focus is on the public service remit of the 
core (terrestrial) channel, with FilmFour and the other non-television services 
downplayed.  2005 continues to stress public service, but begins to apply it to the 
entire C4 portfolio, describing its newly launched digital More4 service ‘a public 
service channel for the 21st century’. By 2006, C4 was envisaged as a convergent 
television brand, with the chairman’s statement illustrated with an image of the 
diverse media outlets under the broadcaster’s auspices.  
 
 
Figure 5 This page from the 2006 Channel 4 Annual report illustrates the segmentation of the corporation 
into convergent media outlets 
 
The 2010  report was illustrated with an image from This is England ’86 with 
the tagline ‘looking back, looking forward’, which speaks both to the historical setting 
of the drama and to the bind that C4 finds itself in as a public service broadcaster in 
a convergent world – looking back to a remit that constrains it, looking forward to an 
unknown future.  Although the 2013 Annual Report’s title boasts of a ‘return on 
innovation’, Channel 4 today is an increasingly small player in a media landscape 
dominated by international competition.  The legacy of the 4Ventures years is a 
digital portfolio which still delivers a decent audience share (an average of 11 per 
cent in 2013), but has failed to secure C4’s financial future: it operated at a £15 
million deficit in 2013. 
  
 
Figure 6 The front cover of the 2010 C4 Annual Report uses This is England '86, a programme which 
demonstrates the convergence between cinema and television, to show its commitment to the traditions 
and future of the corporation 
C4’s attempts to become a broader-based media corporation suffered from a 
lack of capitalisation, dependence on an unpredictable and depleting means of 
finance in advertising, and, ultimately, a lack of genuine vision about how a small 
television broadcaster might play to its strengths.  2013’s ‘Born Risky’ advertising 
campaign suggests that these strengths historically were innovation and experiment.  
Channel 4’s ability to do this in future, under pressure from mounting competition 
and an unsteady financial basis, is likely to be limited. 
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